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CHAPTER VII 
 
FIKRET ČAUŠEVIĆ 
 
 
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM OF B-H 
 
1. Characteristics of the Financial System 
 
The financial system of both B-H entities is very rigid and based on just two types of 
financial institutions: commercial banks and insurance societies. Early this year, there was a 
total of 55 banks and 25 insurance societies in B-H. As insurance societies are of almost no 
significance in financing the business sector and the household sector, the only sources of 
finance for the two are loans from commercial banks and credit lines of international 
financial institutions or countries interested in participating in the reconstruction and 
recovery of the B-H economy. In an earlier chapter, I emphasised the fact that 
reconstruction would have been impossible without the active participation of the 
international community. These sources are precious, but only a small part (8.4%) was 
directed towards loans for the business sector.   
 A very important provision of the Dayton Agreement was to assign to the state level 
the responsibility for monetary policy, i.e. the introduction of a common B-H currency. The 
Central Bank of B-H was established on 11 August 1997, and the convertible mark was 
introduced in June 1998. In September 1999 the convertible mark became the common 
currency and the only unit for transfer of payments. The hard currency reserve of the 
Central Bank of B-H continued to grow and reached the level of 1,042 million BAM 
[convertible mark] on 31 December 2000. During 2000, preparations were accelerated for 
the greatest undertaking in the financial system of a country in transition - total transfer of 
the payment system to commercial banks. Officially, the inland payment system was 
transferred to commercial banks on 5 January 2001.  At the moment, 40 banks are licensed 
for inland payments in B-H (after the introduction of interim management in Hercegovacka 
banka). 
 The Central Bank of B-H functions on the rules of the currency board, which means 
that this institution is not authorised to offer loans to commercial banks. Also, pursuant to 
the Law on the Central Bank of B-H, this institution cannot buy bonds that the B-H 
government or the governments of the entities may issue. In the currency board system, 
commercial banks must observe the following rule: 
 
  "If commercial bank lends excessively, the borrowers spend the excess, for 
instance by writing cheques. In the payments system, more funds flow out of the bank 
than flow into the bank. To prevent the outflow from bankrupting it, a commercial 
bank holds reserves. The loans of commercial banks are limited by their need to 
maintain sufficient reserves to enable depositors to convert deposits into reserves on 
demand and to withstand outflows of reserves through the payments system."1   
 
 This rule has particularly significant implications for all countries where there are 
currency boards, as these systems do not include state institutions which may ensure 
additional solvency of the system or decrease systemic risks.  Decrease of systemic risk in 
a currency board system may be achieved only with an increase in the index of turnover of 
the current amount of cash in use, i.e. more rapid and more efficient cash transfers. It was 
exactly for this reason that the reform of payments system was undertaken.   
 However, the growth of the pace of cash flow may not produce in the short term any 
effect on the growth of funds available for the decrease of the cost of working capital (short-
term loans) nor the creation of a larger deposit base of the commercial banks intended for 
securing mid-term loans, which would allow the business sector to structure their sources of 
funding with lower costs (lower interest rates).  Another problem is related to the position of 
                                                
1 Henke, Jonung, Schuler, op.cit, p. 63. 
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commercial banks in the process of financial deregulation.  Financial deregulation means an 
abolishment of financial repression, i.e. the removal of state regulations from the financial 
sector.  A consistently implemented financial deregulation practically means that state 
bodies responsible for economic policy have no influence in setting interest rates, either 
short or long term, and thus no influence in the cost of sources of funding of the business 
sector.  In a deregulated financial sector, commercial banks are left with the possibility to 
determine the interest rate freely, depending on the demand for cash, but also to decide 
freely on interest rates on ordinary deposits and time deposits.   
 Since the process of financial deregulation is an international phenomenon and 
since it has already been implemented to a greater or lesser extent in different regions of 
the world, results of research on the consequences of financial deregulation are quite 
interesting.  In one of the most comprehensive studies of financial deregulation, Williamson 
and Mahar2 arrived at the conclusion that in almost all the countries (except for United 
Kingdom and Switzerland), irrespective of the level of development, the first reaction of 
commercial banks to financial deregulation was an increase of interest rates deposits, in 
order to attract more clients. The growth of deposit interest rates inevitably led to a sudden 
growth of interest rates for loans and a considerable growth of the cost of financing working 
capital and investments. The increase in the cost of investments produced an aggregate 
decrease in the overall volume of investments. A drop in the employment rate was a logical 
consequence. A positive side of financial deregulation was manifested in the growth of 
effectiveness of individual investments, but also in the aforementioned significant decrease 
of overall investments.  
 Results and consequences of financial deregulation in both developed and 
developing countries are very important for B-H, as B-H has also implemented financial 
deregulation. The state has no competence in setting interest rates, nor in directing 
finances based on a set industrial or development policy. The result of this approach to 
financial deregulation was reflected in the view, supported by a group of foreign experts, 
that establishment of as many commercial banks as possible should be supported, in order 
to create a competitive structure which would, following the logic of a developed market, 
lead to a drop in interest rates. The same position was advocated by international experts 
regarding the opening of as many small businesses as possible. Namely, I have often heard 
discussions arguing that a decreasing number of registered small businesses in B-H in the 
past two years is a negative trend.  However, the problem of this position is that it relies on 
the assumption that there are developed market structures, with a clear role of key state 
institutions which supervise and ensure the application of laws.  Unfortunately, an 
institutional structure of this type is still absent in B-H, so the application of the said logic in 
B-H often produces counter-productive results.  The view that the financial sector should be 
allowed to establish as many commercial banks as possible, and that the competition of 
those banks would lead to a decrease of interest rates in the first four years after the war, 
did not prove correct, since it implied a low ratio of founding capital, which facilitated the 
establishment of a large number of banks.   
 The establishment of a large number of banks with modest capital, seen within the 
context of application of provisions of the Basle Committee for Banking Risk Management, 
meant that practically no bank in B-H was able to support a large investment project of a 
potential multiplication effect on economic growth and employment. Additional negative 
effects of insufficiently planned financial deregulation in the time period 1995 - early 1999 
were manifested in redirection of part of finance approved from credit lines of international 
financial organisations (the World Bank) or individual countries (USA - USAID), for non-
specific, speculative purposes.  Finally, the expectation that a large number of banks would 
produce lower interest rates was not fulfilled until the moment when insolvency reached 
enormous proportions. One of the intermediate factors of creation of the basis for the 
enormous growth of insolvency was the approach that loans should only be directed 
towards business activities with rapid turnover and high profits.  Rapid turnover was realised 
in trade and part of the service industry which involved a more than 50% grey and black 
market participation in the said period.   
                                                
2 John Williamson, Molly Mahar, A Survey of Financial Liberalization, Princeton, New Jersey, November 1998. 
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 It is obvious that this system is not development-oriented, nor can it produce a 
development stimulus. Linking these problems with the first part of the text (employment), 
the problem grows proportionately. In the financial system of B-H, there are no institutions 
which may provide adequate finance to resolve the problems of huge, real and covert 
unemployment. The problem of insolvency of the business sector causes the withdrawal of 
commercial banks from financing the business sector and greater focus on offering loans to 
private citizens. This trend has been particularly evident in the past nine months and is 
showing no signs of improvement, despite the fact that in the latter half of 2000, three 
eminent banks (Raiffeisen Bank, Volksbank, BBI) received licenses and started to develop 
their business. Still, the arrival of these banks is a positive sign and an indicator of possible 
improvement in business sector finance.   
 
Table 1. Consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks in B-H 
                                                                                                       - in million BAM 
 
No. 
  
 Assets / Liabilities  
 
    Federation of B-H 
 
   Republika Srpska 
 
  31/12 
 1999 
30/6 
 2000 
31/12 
 2000 
31/12 
 1999 
30/6 
 2000 
31/12 
 2000 
 Assets       
1. Reserve 265 233 267 11 23 22
2. Hard currency assets 750 815 901  82 101  91
3. Receivables from 
government 
28 20 23 3 0 6
4. Receivables from non-
financial firms 1,526 1,638 1,663 942
 
959 960
5. Receivables from citizens  272 329 379  4 10 22
   
 TOTAL ASSETS 2,841 3,035 3,233 1,042
 
1,093 1,101
     LIABILITIES  
6. General government 
deposits  
84 61  69 52 53 40
7. Local currency ordinary 
deposits 482 546 601 103
 
127 152
8. Foreign currency ordinary 
deposits 427 440 487 39
 
 7 66
9. Local currency  
time/savings deposits 21 51 65 2
 
5 11
10. Foreign currency 
time/savings deposits 434  
449
459 143
 
82 16
11. Bonds 0  
0
0 9 9 4
12. Foreign currency liabilities 917    980 1,007 598 672 573
13. Government funds  0 7 0 0 0 0
14. Capital accounts 842 783 807 367 334 320
15.  Other (net) - 366 - 282 - 269 - 271 - 196 -  81
 
 
 
  TOTAL LIABILITIES 2,841 3,035 3,233 1,042
 
1,093 1,101
 
Source: Central Bank of B-H, Bulletin 4/2000, pp. 89-95. 
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 Commercial banks are for-profit institutions and they are guided by profit. Naturally, 
this is an undisputed fact and they will, logically, not approve loans to businesses with no 
debt servicing capability. The problem is, however, that at the moment there are no private 
or state institutions in B-H capable of inducing an investment cycle, particularly projects of 
enterprise restructuring. Therefore, I believe that international financial institutions, in 
collaboration with renowned international private investment funds, should develop 
business sector financing schemes, special sources of financing for the restructuring of B-H 
enterprises. In view of the fact that the Central Bank of B-H will function on the currency 
board principles until the end of 2002, it would be good to use the authority of the 
international community and the Governor of the Central Bank of B-H and allow this 
institution, managed by a foreign expert, to use discretionary rights and influence the 
regulation of solvency of the system on the basis of the lender of last resort principle. 
Facilitating this type of solvency management would be very dangerous if the international 
community was not to support this approach firmly, but on the other hand, maintenance of 
the existing rigidity increases the danger of chronic systemic insolvency and expensive 
sources of preservation of solvency. Therefore, this approach would allow the international 
community to cut down on the systemic solvency risk. This move would not resolve the 
development problems of B-H economy. Therefore, one of the most important moves of the 
international community, in collaboration with reputable investment funds, would be the 
establishment of a joint investment-development fund,  in co-operation with IBRD, EBRD, 
USAID, KfW, IBJ and institutional investors from the US and the EU. The establishment of 
this institution would mean a considerable decrease of the risk linked with investments in 
this region (not only B-H, but other countries in the Balkans as well) and the terms of 
financing and know-how provided by these institutions would allow a decrease in the cost of 
investment capital and an acceleration of economic growth and employment. 
 
 
2. Problems Noted in the Financial System 
 
The main problem of the financial system of Bosnia-Herzegovina is its rigidity, i.e. an 
almost total dependence on the business philosophy of commercial banks. The position of 
the international community that total financial liberalisation is a necessary precondition of 
an effective market economy, in conjunction with the possibilities which exist for local 
authorities to control foreign trade and abuse the state border in order to enjoy unlawful 
additional profits, have resulted in the establishment of a large number of small banks with 
modest capital on the one hand, and the orientation of these banks towards business 
sectors with rapid financial turnover with a significant share held by the grey and black 
economy on the other.   
Financial liberalisation influenced the creation of high interest rates for short-term 
loans, which decreased considerably the possibility of structuring the sources of finance for 
working capital of business in a sustainable way. Improvement of financial discipline with 
the introduction of international standards into banking meant a withdrawal of banks from 
financing risky projects, defining as risky all projects where there was any late payments on 
loans. The debt servicing capability of businesses with large number of employees is 
considerably lower, which is an additional complication of the problem of maintaining 
current solvency.   
The launch of the Central Bank of B-H as a unique institution for all of Bosnia-
Herzegovina was undoubtedly a stabilisation factor, in the sense of establishing a common 
currency and a more effective co-ordination of the entities' banking agencies. However, the 
principles of currency board which do not allow the Central Bank of B-H to act as a lender of 
last resort, thus with no possibility of managing financial crisis, removes from this institution 
the potential to influence the direction of the business cycle and to help solve the insolvency 
problem.   
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3. Recommendations 
 
In view of the need to ensure financial discipline on one hand, and the need for 
financial crisis management in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as other countries of Southeast 
Europe on the other, what is needed is that, together with the introduction of a customs 
union in Southeast Europe and between this region and the EU, there should also be 
introduced a single monetary institution for all the countries in the region. The single 
monetary institution might be the Central Bank of SEE countries, with discretionary rights, 
but also headed by central bankers from developed countries (the European Union, the 
United States, or a person appointed by international financial institutions) together with 
representatives of SEE countries. In other words, both in theory and in practice, a central 
bank with discretionary rights, managed by conservative central bankers, would be the best 
solution, or at least the next best3. The international community would use its authority and 
appoint a governor, thus elevating significantly the credibility of the institution. A regional 
central bank could have branches in all SEE countries. A regional central bank would also 
have the right to buy state bonds pursuant to previous agreements on the issue of public 
debt between the SEE countries and the IMF. A regional central bank would not appear as 
the principal buyer of state bonds, but by appearing as a buyer, it would stabilise the bond 
market and promote more balanced development of capital markets.    
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